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Abstract 
Expertise and autonomy are cornerstones to the effective operation and legitimacy of European Regulatory Agencies 
(ERAs). Yet, we know little about ERAs’ actual autonomy, nor about factors shaping it. This article studies ERAs’ actual 
autonomy from public and private actors, emphasising two crucial explanatory factors: expertise and rulemaking com-
petences. The lack of insights on expertise is particularly striking, as expertise—the “raison d’être” and main resource of 
expert bodies—provides ERAs with a potentially powerful means to increase autonomy. Relying on a rational institu-
tionalist framework within which ERAs enjoy substantive discretion to pursue their goals, the study empirically com-
pares three powerful ERAs—the European Medicines Agency, the European Chemicals Agency, and the European Food 
Safety Authority. Based on the analysis of 39 semi-structured expert interviews, findings show that expertise is a crucial 
explanation for ERAs’ substantive autonomy from the Commission. Towards research intensive private stakeholders, 
the role of expertise becomes less pronounced. Instead, ERAs are more successful in protecting their autonomy by en-
gaging in the risk-averse interpretation of the regulatory framework and by adapting rules over time to adapt their 
needs: they engage in “procedural insulation”. Political salience provides a scope condition for ERAs to use expert 
knowledge and rulemaking competences more strategically—potentially undermining scientific quality. 
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1. Introduction 
European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs) have become in-
creasingly important features in the European polity, 
regulating many areas of daily life. Forming part of a 
global rise of expert bodies, ERAs are expected to cope 
more effectively with complex socio-economic chal-
lenges and to overcome political short-sightedness. 
Their scientific expertise and their autonomy from ex-
ternal influence form the two building blocks for the 
high-quality decision-making of ERAs—and hence their 
effective operation and legitimacy (Majone, 2009). Ex-
pertise means accurate information that can be put to 
adequate use by “experts”. Autonomy refers to the de-
gree to which an agency can actually take decisions ir-
respective of external actors’ preferences. 
Although expertise and autonomy are deemed cen-
tral to the operation of ERAs, their specific contribution 
to the functioning of ERAs remains unclear in many re-
spects. In fact, many facets of ERAs’ day-to-day opera-
tion remain in the dark (Groenleer, 2014). When explain-
ing the autonomy of ERAs, two—so far neglected—
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factors seem particularly worthwhile to study: an agen-
cy’s expertise and its rulemaking competences. Exper-
tise “substitutes power in certain policy areas” 
(Quaglia, 2009, p. 13), potentially forming a “key pre-
requisite for bureaucratic autonomy” (Carpenter, 2001, 
p. 17). As expert organisations, ERAs are particularly 
likely to capitalise on their expert resources. In addi-
tion, ERAs’ extensive soft-law rulemaking competences 
enable them to modify existing—and introduce new—
regulatory rules. Therewith, ERAs could insulate them-
selves by actively raising procedural standards. Alt-
hough Moe (1995) regards these expertise- and rule-
based explanations pivotal to the autonomy of ERAs, 
they lack systematic scholarly attention. Accordingly, 
the research question is: 
How (and under what conditions) can ERAs capital-
ise on their expertise and rulemaking competences 
to “forge” their autonomy? 
Analytically, the project builds on an institutionalist 
framework within which ERAs are equipped with the 
necessary room of manoeuvre to pursue their goals 
and interests. Reflecting recent insights on “knowledge 
utilisation”, the ability (and necessity) of ERAs to shape 
their autonomy depends on an important scope condi-
tion: the political salience of the regulatory issue at 
stake (Boswell, 2008). Providing concise expectations 
on agency autonomy to guide the empirical analysis, 
the framework explicitly distinguishes between the po-
litical principals—centrally the European Commission—
and private stakeholders of ERAs. The different nature 
of their relationships with ERAs is expected to shape 
agency autonomy in different ways. 
Empirically drawing on original expert interviews 
with agency staff and external actors, the study pro-
vides unique comparative insights on the autonomy 
and day-to-day operation of three powerful ERAs: the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA), the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA), and the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA). Given their technical mandates, these 
ERAs are particularly well suited to study the postulat-
ed relationships between expertise and autonomy 
(“most-likely-cases”).  
After introducing the general debate on ERAs, the 
analytical framework develops the expectations con-
cerning the effects of expertise and rulemaking compe-
tences on the autonomy. Following a short methodo-
logical note, introducing the selected ERAs, the 
empirical analysis first shows whether expertise holds 
its promise to protect agency autonomy. In a second 
step, the study assesses whether ERAs are able to capi-
talize on (the interpretation and modification of) the 
regulatory framework, therewith engaging in proce-
dural insulation. The study concludes by linking find-
ings to recent debates on agency operation and their 
role in EU governance.  
1.1. Regulation by Information: Autonomy and 
Expertise of ERAs 
Reflecting a global “rise of the unelected”, the EU can 
be depicted as a fore-runner of expert governance 
(Curtin, 2014; Vibert, 2007). Next to comitology com-
mittees and other forms of network governance for 
expert advice (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008), the European de-
cision makers rely on the expert advice of so-called Eu-
ropean Regulatory Agencies (ERAs). Forming part of a 
greater population of EU agencies, eleven such ERAs 
exist and are primarily concerned—as their name sug-
gests—with regulation. Functionally disaggregated 
from political decision-making processes, ERAs form 
the most consistent institutional example of autono-
mous expert advice in the EU (Busuioc & Groenleer, 
2014). Accordingly, expertise and autonomy form the 
two operational cornerstones of ERAs. 
Since ERAs ought to provide policy makers with 
sound expert advice, the expertise to inform this ad-
vice constitutes their main organisational resource. The 
(scientific) expertise1 provided by ERAs does not only 
have to concord to abstract scientific standards. Com-
monly referred to as “regulatory science”, ERAs’ exper-
tise has to turn into serviceable “truth” by being timely 
and useful (Lentsch & Weingart, 2011, p. 9).2 Directly 
feeding into policy-making, it is particularly “suscepti-
ble to divergent, socially conditioned interpreta-
tions…since quality standards tend to be more fluid, 
controversial, and subject to political considerations” 
(Jasanoff, 1995, p. 282). In this vein, the expertise of 
ERAs is neither “neutral, objective, [nor] technically vir-
tuous” (Shapiro & Guston, 2007, p. 543). A central rea-
son for divergent expert interpretations lies in the 
recognition that expertise is always linked to (groups 
of) “experts” or professionals (Radaelli, 1995). They 
form part of professional communities (Noordegraaf, 
2007, p. 767), often referred to as “epistemic commu-
nities”, sharing sets of “causal beliefs and common no-
tions of validity” (Haas, 1992, p. 2; Davis Cross, 2012). 
Within and across these expert communities, scientific 
controversies “can arise out of ‘honest philosophical 
differences’ linked to disciplinary training, institutional 
affiliation, or professional status” (Jasanoff, 1995, p. 
281; see also Joerges, Ladeur, & Vos, 1997).3 Nonethe-
less, expert knowledge can be put to scrutiny regarding 
its reasoned arguments based on substantive and 
methodological standards (Brown, 2009, p. 202).  
                                                          
1 The terms “expertise”, “scientific expertise” or “expert 
knowledge” are used interchangeably—if not explicitly stated 
otherwise. 
2 Other authors speak of “trans-science” or “mode-2 science” 
(for an overview, see Lentsch & Weingart (2011)). 
3 Prospect theory provides empirical evidence that experts rely 
on different “heuristics” to interpret the same information 
(Tversky & Kahnemann, 1992).  
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Autonomy refers to the degree of freedom that 
ERAs experience when they take decisions “relatively 
unbound by the preferences and interests” of external 
actors (Groenleer, 2014, p. 258). At the same time, an 
autonomous agency is not required to operate in isola-
tion, as external expert advice might often contribute 
to ERA’s prescribed goals. One should distinguish be-
tween formal and de-facto autonomy. Formal autono-
my describes an agency’s discretion to act or make de-
cisions as defined in its founding regulation (Carpenter, 
2001). Four dimensions are often identified: legal, fi-
nancial, personnel, and policy autonomy. 
This article is interested in the policy autonomy of 
ERAs. Whereas all EU agencies are independent legal 
entities—and thus legally autonomous—, their formal 
autonomy to take policy decisions is often said to be 
limited (Groenleer 2009, 2014): in fact, all EU agen-
cies—including the ERAs studied in this article—are 
deprived of formal policy-making competences. Alt-
hough their scientific opinions form the basis for risk 
regulation in the EU, the binding regulatory decisions 
reside with the Commission and the respective Stand-
ing Committees; often jointly referred to as the “risk 
managers” (Busuioc, 2013). Since Carpenter (2001, p. 
5) argues that autonomy is quintessentially about “in-
dependent policymaking power”, this lack of formal 
decision-making powers led scholars to argue that 
ERAs’ policy autonomy is considerably circumscribed. 
This study, however, draws an explicit distinction be-
tween policy autonomy and policy influence (Maggetti, 
2009): if ERAs take a decision unbound by external in-
terests, they will experience high degrees of autonomy. 
Whether this decision is then adopted by the risk man-
agers does not affect the autonomy of ERAs but rather 
concerns the agency’s policy influence—lying outside 
of the scope of this article. 
In any case, an agency’s formal (policy) autonomy 
does not automatically translate into actual or de facto 
autonomy (Carpenter, 2001; Olsen, 2009). Once an 
agency is created, its actual autonomy might change 
over time: Reflecting neo-institutional thought, the au-
tonomy of expert bodies is shaped by—but not limited 
to the effects of—legal and organisational factors 
(Rittberger & Wonka, 2011). Despite the illustrated im-
portance of reputation-building and institutionalisation 
(Carpenter, 2001; Groenleer, 2009), however, we lack 
systematic insights on the actual policy autonomy of 
ERAs (Egeberg & Trondal, 2011). Therefore, this article 
studies the de facto autonomy of ERAs in developing 
their main policy output: their risk assessments.  
Expertise and rulemaking competences provide 
two—so far neglected—explanations for this autono-
my. With the recent exception of a “knowledge utilisa-
tion” study (Boswell, 2008), general claims of the im-
portance of expertise in policy-making have not been 
complemented by systematic empirical analyses 
(Quaglia, 2009; Radaelli, 1995). We also lack infor-
mation on the ability of ERAs to capitalise on their 
rulemaking competences to protect their autonomy 
(Kaufman, 2001). ERAs are particularly well-suited to 
study the above-question, as they closely interact with 
scientific and advocacy actors within so-called regula-
tory networks. The network interactions with regula-
tors and expert bodies contribute to agency expertise 
and thus regulatory quality. This study assumes that 
the expert bodies of these networks pose no harm to 
the autonomy of ERAs, since they operate in line with 
the “logic of science” (Davis Cross, 2012). 
The regulatory networks, however, also provide so-
called advocacy actors with direct access to decision 
makers (Braun, 2012). The public actors (the European 
Commission, the Member States, the European Council 
and the European Parliament) can be considered “prin-
cipals” of ERAs. Private advocacy actors include indus-
try companies (and federations) as well as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). Existing research 
shows that advocacy actors strive to impose their own 
preferences onto ERAs, potentially threatening their 
autonomous decision-making (Groenleer, 2009). The 
network involvement of ERAs therefore serves as a po-
tential catalyst both to the generation of expert 
knowledge and to threats on autonomy.  
Due to the observed limited role of the European 
Parliament, the European Council and Member States 
for ERA decision-making (Groenleer, 2009), this study 
focuses on the autonomy of ERAs from the Commission 
as well as private stakeholders.4 
2. Analytical Framework 
The project sets out a rational institutional framework 
to study the behaviour of ERAs. Rational institutionalist 
theory argues that “EU institutions matter, shaping 
both the policy process and policy outcomes in pre-
dictable ways” (Pollack, 2015, p. 20). Despite the im-
portance of institutions—including formal rules and 
procedures—, this theoretical approach leaves agents 
with ample room of manoeuvre to pursue their goals 
and interests (Olsen, 2007, p. 13). 
Within this framework, the article draws on insights 
from delegation theory and “knowledge utilization”: 
This article identifies the areas of discretion for ERAs to 
forge their own autonomy; it then develops expecta-
tions on how they can use their discretion by capitaliz-
ing on (2.1.) their expertise, and (2.2.) their rule-
making competences. Insights on “knowledge utiliza-
                                                          
4 Member States in particular might nonetheless wield sub-
stantive influence on regulatory policy-making in the EU given 
their membership in Standing Committees. This policy influ-
ence, however, does not undermine the autonomy of ERAs. In-
stead, it is deemed to affect (and potentially undermines) the 
importance of the agencies’ risk assessments in the overall pol-
icy-making process. 
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tion” suggest that (2.3.) the necessity and ability of 
ERAs to actively “forge” their autonomy—a main goal 
of any bureaucratic actor—depends on the scope con-
dition of political salience (Boswell, 2008). 
2.1. The Power of Expertise—Asymmetries &  
Counter-Expertise 
Established to provide public decision-makers with sci-
entific advice, ERAs are assumed to host high levels of 
scientific expertise. Delegation literature suggests that 
the distribution of information is essential to under-
stand the relationship between a principal and an 
agent (Majone, 2002). Monopolising relevant infor-
mation provides agents with a powerful means to 
guard, and even to increase, their discretionary space 
to take autonomous decisions (Gailmard, 2002; Lavertu 
& Weimer, 2009). Since the Commission—arguably the 
agencies’ main principal—delegated risk assessments 
and transferred a significant share of its experts to 
ERAs, the Commission itself is expected to hold limited 
degrees of scientific expertise. The lack of expert ca-
pacity among Commission DGs might even threaten 
their ability to adequately control the quality of agency 
opinions (Busuioc, 2013). ERAs are therefore expected 
to benefit from a classical information asymmetry that 
is sufficient to prevent the Commission from influenc-
ing the decision-making of ERAs. 
Towards private stakeholders—particularly towards 
industry—delegation theory provides less explanatory 
potential, since the relationship between ERAs and 
stakeholders does not reflect a principal-agent rela-
tionship. Rather, industry acts as a client to ERAs. 
Moreover, one cannot speak of typical information 
asymmetries benefiting ERAs. In fact, industry might 
even hold more expertise than ERAs: industrial compa-
nies develop the products and substances submitted to 
ERAs for authorisation and perform the required tests. 
Regulators rarely engage in empirical experiments 
themselves but instead rely on data provided by pri-
vate applicants. 
Nonetheless, the resource-based reasoning ade-
quately describes the relationship between ERAs and 
private stakeholders. Holding high-quality expert re-
sources themselves, ERAs might be in a position to (a) 
question scientific arguments put forward by industry 
and potentially develop counter-expertise. ERAs can al-
so (b) identify and dismiss non-scientific arguments 
that go beyond the decision-making criteria specified in 
the agency regulations and guidelines. Even though in-
formation asymmetries are unlikely to materialise, 
ERAs are therefore expected to hold sufficient expert 
resources to fence off external influence by industry 
and NGOs. Although to varying degrees, the scientific 
expertise of ERAs might therefore protect them effec-
tively from external influence from the Commission 
and private actors. 
Expectation 1a: Information asymmetries towards 
the Commission provide ERAs with high degrees of 
autonomy. 
Expectation 1b: ERAs hold sufficient scientific ex-
pertise to counter scientific claims by private stake-
holders, therewith protecting their autonomy. 
One should bear in mind that the relationship between 
expertise and autonomy is not unidirectional. Both 
concepts might be linked in an interdependence mod-
el: While expertise is expected to increase autonomy, 
autonomy might also contribute to expertise (by in-
creasing the reputation, attracting high-level scien-
tists). This study restricts itself to the ways in which ex-
pertise contributes to autonomy. 
2.2. The Regulatory Framework & Procedural Insulation 
The effects of expertise are complemented by a pro-
cess of procedural insulation that potentially increases 
agency autonomy from private stakeholders. Since the 
Commission has established the regulatory framework 
governing the operation of ERAs and acts as “guardian 
of the treaties”, it casts a legal “shadow of hierarchy” 
onto agency rulemaking. Accordingly, procedural insu-
lation serves ERAs to protect their autonomy towards 
private stakeholders. While extensive regulatory provi-
sions (guidelines and procedures, test methods, time 
frames for the assessment process) restrict the behav-
iour of ERAs, they simultaneously limit the access 
points of external actors, protecting ERAs’ autonomy 
(Gehring & Krapohl, 2007). Kaufman (2001, p. 34) ob-
serves that “red tape to one person may be a treasured 
procedural protection to another”. 
At the same time, however, the regulatory frame-
work is far from static. Regulatory rules require interpre-
tations and many ask for modifications once an ERA has 
gained more experience in implementing the regulatory 
framework. Within the larger legal framework set by the 
European institutions, ERAs moreover hold substantive 
“soft-law” rulemaking competences (Chiti, 2013). By (re-
)interpreting and modifying existing rules and introduc-
ing new ones, ERAs can effectively raise regulatory 
standards, for instance by altering the scientific infor-
mation required for a product authorisation. These regu-
latory changes might significantly improve the quality of 
the regulatory output. At the same time, however, the 
changes could limit the ability of external actors to influ-
ence the decision-making of ERAs (Moe, 1995).  
E2: By engaging in “procedural insulation”, ERAs 
can increase their level of autonomy from private 
stakeholders.  
2.3. Political Salience as a Scope Condition 
The effectiveness of ERAs’ means to protect their au-
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tonomy hinges on the scope condition of political sali-
ence. Salient issues are those with a broad scope and 
intensity of conflicts, either for economic or political 
reasons (Gormley, 1986, p. 598). Since highly salient is-
sues involve high stakes, external actors are believed to 
increase their efforts to influence agency decision-
making. This increased external pressure might (partly) 
undermine the ability of ERAs to guard their autonomy 
via the means specified above. 
E3: High political salience alters the means of ERAs 
to guard their autonomy. 
Concerning the autonomy of ERAs, two scenarios are 
viable:  
a. If the conditioning effect of political salience 
were applicable, one could expect ERAs to expe-
rience lower degrees of autonomy in areas of 
high political salience (E3a).  
b. In face of highly salient issues, however, ERAs 
might also strategically adapt their behaviour to 
the changed circumstances. Rather than engag-
ing in “instrumental problem solving, ERAs could 
make strategic use of their expertise and/or 
rulemaking competences with the primary goal 
of protecting their autonomy (Boswell, 2008; 
Schrefler, 2010). This change in behaviour could 
guard ERAs” high degrees of autonomy—even in 
areas of high political salience (E3b).  
To assess the relevance of political salience as a scope 
condition, this project studies regulatory issues of both 
high and low salience. This approach sheds light on the 
reach of the study’s main expectations. Presumably, 
salience does not systematically vary across ERAs, but 
rather across issue areas. 
3. A Methodological Note—Comparing EMA, EFSA, 
and ECHA 
Guided by theoretically informed expectations, the 
study remains exploratory. Comparing three ERAs pro-
vides an adequate balance between the necessary ana-
lytical leverage to assess general expectations, and a 
desirable level of detail. 
Although EMA, EFSA, and ECHA differ in certain re-
gards, their extensive similarities recommend them for 
a comparative study on agency autonomy. Created for 
different reasons at different points in time, they none-
theless share important organisational and functional 
traits (Groenleer, 2014): all three ERAs hold similar 
mandates, as they serve as gatekeepers for products to 
enter the respective markets and evaluate products 
and substances already available—potentially with-
drawing the marketing permits (Vos, 2014, p. 20). Giv-
en their scientific tasks, the selected ERAs are most 
likely to capitalise on available expertise to protect 
their autonomy. Despite minor variations, all three 
ERAs experience high degrees of formal autonomy, set-
ting them apart from other ERAs—often equipped with 
less formal autonomy. Although deprived of formal de-
cision-making competences, all three ERAs are moreo-
ver perceived of as “de-facto” decision-makers in the 
EU (Busuioc, 2013, p. 211). Findings on these—
arguably most powerful—ERAs therefore provide most 
instructive insights on EU policy-making. Moreover, all 
three ERAs operate in a similar environment (industry 
structure, stakeholder activities). As Groenleer (2014, 
p. 265) argues, the (limited) observable differences 
across regulatory domains do not “explain a difference 
in agency autonomy”. Finally, alternative explanatory 
factors linked to the agencies’ organisational structure 
are controlled for: all three ERAs come in similar sizes 
and shapes, being composed of an agency secretariat, 
scientific committees, and a management board. At 
the same time, the cases provide the necessary inter-
nal and cross-case variation concerning their de facto 
autonomy, as pointed out by Groenleer concerning 
EMA and EFSA (2009, 2014). Their (use of) expertise is 
also expected to differ. 
The analysis rests on 39 semi-structured expert in-
terviews with agency members and external actors 
(ERA Secretariats, Scientific Committees, Management 
Boards; EU Commission, EU Parliament, NGOs, industry 
federations), providing detailed insights on day-to-day 
processes related to agency decision-making and au-
tonomy.5 The (perceptional) interview statements on 
the main concepts were coded according to a pre-
established coding scheme (i.e., “high/medium/low au-
tonomy”). Coding was based on general perceptions of 
interviewees on agency operation, and references to 
specific instances of (non-)influence, refering to e.g. 
authorisation procedures where stakeholders (are per-
ceived to) have successfully altered an agency’s opin-
ion. This approach is complemented by extensive nar-
rative quotes. Potential biases inherent to interview 
data, i.e., overestimation of expertise or autonomy, are 
accounted for by (a) the systematic selection of inter-
viewees, and (b) the triangulation of interview data 
with documents, more specifically annual agency re-
ports and external evaluations conducted on all three 
ERAs. 
4. Analysis 
Despite the frequent interactions between all three 
ERAs and external actors, the interview data suggests 
that all three ERAs under study experience high de-
grees of autonomy from external actors:  
                                                          
5 Ossege (forthcoming) provides more details on the selection 
of interviewees. 
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Scientifically, yes. I would say that the scientific 
outputs are not at any level influenced by DG 
SANCO views or by the EP views or by stakeholder 
views. I think, scientifically, it is really independent. 
But of course, economically and at the management 
level it has boundaries and it has a lot of links with 
others. But that doesn’t affect the scientific 
outputs. (EFSA3) 
38 out of 39 interviewees share this perception, while 
one interviewee observes industry influence in EFSA’s 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (EFSA-
GMO). At the same time, two interviewees dealing 
with ECHA raise tangible criticism on the chemicals 
agency, claiming that the agency’s proximity to indus-
try threatens to affect its decision-making: 
If you look at what experts they are getting from 
particular disciplines, etc. and how many from in-
dustry or from academia, how many are coming 
from Germany with a huge chemical industry, and 
you can foresee a certain amount of industry cosi-
ness. I don’t have any figures, but I have the im-
pression that many industry friendly people are 
working for ECHA—I can’t prove it. (ECHA-NGO; 
similar: ECHA-COM) 
Assuming the validity of interview statements, these 
challenges—although pointing at a potential threat—
do not undermine the observed high levels of autono-
my of all three ERAs.  
4.1. The Role of Scientific Expertise—Asymmetries and 
Counter Expertise 
ERAs’ extensive expertise—generated inter alia through 
the involvement of experts (from NCAs and other ex-
pert bodies) into their decision-making bodies—
provides a strong explanation for autonomy. The ef-
fects of this high quality expertise on autonomy play 
out differently towards the European Commission and 
private stakeholders. 
4.1.1. Asymmetries towards the Principal 
The Directorate Generals (DGs) in the Commission ex-
tensively interact with the ERAs at the scientific and 
the management level, both formally and informally 
(ECHA-COM). Nevertheless, the DGs are perceived to 
have little influence on the agencies’ decisions. While 
the Commission has an observer status in the commit-
tees of each agency, its representatives do not take ac-
tive part in the discussions. As one interviewee in-
volved in an ECHA committee recalls her experience 
(ECHA8): “The Commission is sitting in the committee 
as an observer, they can contribute to the discussion, if 
they want to. But I do not recall that they said any-
thing”. This perception is shared by the other interview-
ees involved in the committee work, across agencies.6  
The limited scientific expertise of Commission rep-
resentatives provides a main explanation for their low 
influence on ERA decision-making: 
It can happen that the people in the Commission do 
not understand the opinion and then they follow up 
with questions. But the Commission completely 
lacks the potential and scientific foundation…. 
(EMA1) 
I do not think they have a lot of scientific expertise. 
They never had. They are policy makers. Of course 
they have scientists working there, and they have 
lawyers working there, but the lawyers do not deal 
with individual decisions and the scientists are not 
supposed to be…I mean the Commission has out-
sourced this sort of questions to the agencies, that 
is why they established agencies….They only need 
to keep the level of expertise that they can under-
stand what is coming and to be properly informed 
so that they can make the decision. (ECHA1) 
While the Commission lacks the expertise to influence 
ERA decision-making, it nonetheless holds enough 
knowledge to follow the latter’s argumentation:  
And so [the Commission representatives] have of 
course their expertise, but now of course with the 
more defined roles of different actors we are the 
body that is supposed to be the technical and scien-
tific body, really having the in-depth scientific ex-
pertise; and they are more deeply into the policy 
and regulatory level so that there is not too much 
overlap. But of course, also we have to understand 
each other and therefore they have relevant exper-
tise for us, and we are consulting with them on is-
sues. (ECHA7) 
If DGs get involved into specific risk assessments, they 
want to be aware of potentially conflicting scientific ar-
guments put forward in the debate before they have to 
deal with them (and potentially defend them) in later 
phases of the policy process and in the court room 
(EMA7; ECHA-COM). Particularly due to this fear of liti-
gation shared by (all three) ERAs and the Commission, 
some interviewees attribute a slightly more influential 
role to the Commission (ECHA1, ECHA-COM, EMA-
Federation). Overall, however, the Commission’s sphere 
of influence is limited to making sure that the decision-
making is in line with legal requirements. This high de-
gree of autonomy from the Commission even holds 
true for EMA, although it has experienced a substantive 
                                                          
6 Similar statements are advanced by EMA6, EMA7; EFSA1, EF-
SA2, EFSA3 EFSA8; ECHA1, ECHA7, ECHA8, ECHA-RAC. 
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surge in oversight since 2010, when DG SANCO replaced 
DG INDUSTRY as the agency’s partner-DG. While the 
greater organisational duplication between the DG SAN-
CO and EMA triggered closer scientific involvement of 
the DG (EMA-Federation), the increased influence ap-
pears limited to legal concerns (Vestlund, 2014). 
With their regulatory oversight role, the DGs pri-
marily contribute to the regulatory consistency of the 
agencies’ output. In line with expectation E1a, they 
lack the scientific expert knowledge to intervene on 
the decision-making. If they engage in expertise-based 
discussions, it rather appears like a knowledge transfer 
from ERAs to the Commission. Accordingly, the lack of 
expertise among Commission DGs appears to be suffi-
cient to prevent them from directly influencing ERAs in 
their assessment work (asserting E1a). 
4.1.2. Counter-Expertise towards Private Stakeholders 
Private stakeholders provide a different picture. As ar-
gued above, ERAs remain rather autonomous in their 
decision-making despite the intensity of interactions 
between ERAs and private stakeholders. Contrary to the 
relationship to the Commission, however, this autonomy 
from private stakeholders, industry in particular, does 
not stem from a traditional information asymmetry. In-
dustry companies heavily invest in research and devel-
opment, attract highly skilled experts, accumulating 
top-level expertise (ECHA-NGO, EFSA-NGO). 
Nonetheless, all three ERAs hold sufficient expertise 
to counter external claims, for instance by uncovering 
rather frequent flaws in application dossiers submitted 
by industry. While flawed dossiers are submitted to all 
three agencies, the respective evaluation reports sug-
gest that the recently established ECHA is most affect-
ed (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2012). One reason 
for these flaws lies in stakeholders’ lack of experience 
with (and expertise on) the rather new regulatory pro-
cedures governing the regulation of chemicals (ECHA4). 
But interviewees of all three ERAs also report on delib-
erate intents to hide “certain things” in application 
documents (ECHA4), and on companies submitting 
flawed data (EFSA-GMO). In this vein, EMA regularly 
request additional information from the applicant, “ei-
ther to solve the problem in a positive way or to say ‘it 
is better to withdraw the product’” (EMA1). As a con-
sequence, applicants in all three ERAs regularly with-
draw their applications before receiving a final (poten-
tially negative) verdict on their application (EMA1, 
EMA-CHMP, EFSA-GMO, ECHA-MSC1). While EMA and 
EFSA do not publish the relevant statistics, EMA’s an-
nual report (2013) indicates that approximately 14.5% 
of the initial market authorisation applications submit-
ted to the Committee for Human Medicinal Products 
(CHMP) between 2009 and 2011 have been withdrawn 
prior to a final agency opinion (an additional 5.5% has 
received a negative opinion).  
Although the interview statements and application 
data retrieved from EMA do not provide a conclusive 
picture, they clearly suggest that ERAs hold the neces-
sary expertise to detect flawed arguments advanced by 
stakeholders (E1b). Whereas high quality expertise 
seems to provide a sufficient explanation for ERAs’ au-
tonomy towards the Commission, it provides ERAs with 
less leverage to protect their autonomy towards pri-
vate stakeholders.  
4.2. Protection towards Stakeholders—The Static 
Framework and Procedural Insulation 
The analytical framework suggested that ERAs benefit 
from a second factor that contributes to the observed 
high degrees of autonomy from private stakeholders. 
Specifically, ERAs might capitalise on (a) the extensive 
regulatory provisions governing their relationship with 
stakeholders, and (b) the process of procedural insulation.  
4.2.1. The Static Regulatory Framework—Rules as 
Procedural Protection 
The analysis shows that the extensive regulatory provi-
sions provide ERAs with a legally robust guiding post 
for action: interviewees depict all three ERAs as highly 
rule-oriented, “strictly respecting legislation” (ECHA-
Federation). This risk averse behaviour of following 
rules “to the letter”—at least partly—aims at avoiding 
litigation (EMA-Federation; EFSA5, ECHA-COM). While 
all three ERAs act very rule-oriented, ECHA is charac-
terised as particularly risk-averse:  
[ECHA staff] are extremely obsessed with proce-
dures. Sometimes it really drives me mad. I can see 
partly why they do it, but it gums up the works to 
some extent. In fact, PwC did a report, they did a 
workshop here and invited some of us there to dis-
cuss. Industry and NGOs agreed that ECHA is very 
bureaucratic, so that is something we share views 
on. (ECHA–NGO) 
Given ECHA’s young history and the subsequent lack of 
established regulatory practices, ECHA faces consider-
ably more legal uncertainty associated with the regula-
tory framework than EMA and EFSA (ECHA8; ECHA-
COM). Gaining experience, however, ECHA appears to 
act more confidently lately (ECHA1; ECHA-COM; ECHA-
Federation). Overall, all three ERAs remain highly rule-
driven. 
Whereas this rule-orientation contributes to auton-
omous expert advice, EFSA’s handling of the nutrition 
and health claims regulation7 suggests that it might al-
                                                          
7 The regulation establishes rules aimed at harmonising nutri-
tion and health claims across Europe. Since the inception of the 
regulation in 2006, this “claim on food labelling, presentation 
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so bring about unintended consequences. Overall—and 
supported by a rejection rate of 80%—EFSA’s evalua-
tion of health claims is widely regarded as highly de-
manding and scientific (ANH Europe, 2011). At least 
some rejections, however, go back to a formalistic in-
terpretation of Council Regulation 1924/2006. In one 
example, EFSA rejected a health claim that “water pre-
vents dehydration”, since the provided information on 
“water loss in tissues” did not qualify as the required 
“risk factor”, but rather as a measure of the disease it-
self. While legally consistent, this decision might raise 
substantive concerns. Natural and botanical food in-
gredients, which have nearly been rejected in their en-
tirety, serve as another illustration (ANH Europe, 2011). 
While EFSA adheres to the standards prescribed in the 
regulation in both examples, the agency runs the danger 
of operating in a vacuum—neglecting potentially re-
distributive effects of its decisions on entire industries.  
The analysis brings another observation to the fore: 
Many stakeholders lack experience with (and expertise 
on) the complex regulatory requirements. NGOs even 
lack the (financial and human) resources to overcome 
this challenge (ECHA-NGO; EMA-NGO). Among indus-
try, especially small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) struggle with the magnitude of formal regulato-
ry requirements. As an industry representative points 
out, companies working with EMA even have difficul-
ties to understand the role of the individual commit-
tees (EMA-Federation). While most industrial compa-
nies know certain regulatory aspects, many lack a 
coherent understanding of the broader regulatory 
framework and the functioning of the agencies. This 
reported lack of regulatory understanding among 
stakeholders circumscribes their ability to influence 
agency decision-making. Consequently, the complexity 
of the regulatory framework (without the complemen-
tary expertise among stakeholders) contributes to the 
autonomy of ERAs. 
At the same time, the complex framework and the 
lack of regulatory understanding potentially under-
mines regulatory quality, as indicated by the substan-
tive amount of flawed applications submitted to the 
recently established ECHA. All three ERAs have intro-
duced various initiatives to overcome these negative 
implications through a variety of initiatives, including 
stakeholder fora to exchange experiences and the es-
tablishment of advice-units: EMA created an SME Of-
fice in 2005, EFSA and ECHA introduced similar applica-
tion helpdesks to support applicants. For ERAs, these 
initiatives provide a double-edged sword: while the 
improved regulatory understanding of stakeholders 
contributes to a smooth regulatory process, the in-
creasing number of court cases suggests that it also 
                                                                                           
and advertising must be clear, concise and based on evidence 
accepted by the whole scientific community” (Council Regula-
tion 1924/2006; Summary).  
provides stakeholders with the means to contest agen-
cy decision-making and potentially undermine auton-
omy (Busuioc, 2013). 
4.2.2. Adapting the Rules 
Even if stakeholders improve their understanding of ex-
isting regulatory rules, however, ERAs can engage in 
procedural insulation: “Any actor implementing law 
needs to interpret law…” (ECHA-MSC2). All three ERAs 
do not only interpret the current regulatory frame-
work, but they have also modified existing rules and in-
troduced new ones concerning the internal operation 
of ERAs and their relationship with external stakehold-
ers. Most of these regulatory changes seem to reflect 
‘instrumental’ problem solving to improve the overall 
regulatory process: detecting deficiencies in the cur-
rent procedures, ERAs alter these rules to prevent fu-
ture regulatory failures. As a side-effect, however, ex-
ternal stakeholders face new regulatory challenges that 
undermine their ability to influence agency decision-
making, contributing the autonomy of ERAs (E2).  
4.3. High Political Salience: Insulation Turning Strategic 
This observed process of procedural insulation be-
comes particularly pronounced in areas of high political 
salience. In salient issues, stakeholders increase their 
pressure on ERAs (ECHA-RAC). At the same time, ERAs 
adapt their behaviour accordingly: Aware of the in-
creased external scrutiny, committee members invest 
additional effort in their deliberations (EFSFA6; ECHA-
RAC). Moreover, all three ERAs engage in procedural 
insulation more systematically:  
[In areas of high salience] we have more leeway. 
There we have a number of documents which are 
guidelines, which are supposed to be followed but 
they are not legally enforceable. So you are not 
breaking the law if you don’t follow them. Many of 
these guidelines are being drawn up by us. [...we 
normally] do a good job, but for particular sensitive 
dossiers we would take extra care, for example in 
how conclusions of an assessment report are word-
ed, or in making sure that the procedure is followed 
to the letter. (EMA4)  
One gets more careful in formulating opinions, to 
makes them really clear. But influence on [the pan-
els’] evaluation behaviour rather not, since the crit-
icism is not valid. Where you also become more 
careful is with public appearances. (EFSA6) 
In the following, two examples of procedural insulation 
serve to exemplify the agencies’ awareness of their 
discretionary space to interpret and modify regulatory 
rules, and to use this discretion in their favour.  
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a) Conflicts of Interest Policies 
Reforms of the policies governing conflicts of interest 
(CoI) provide a prominent example of procedural insu-
lation in all three ERAs. Dealing with a main threat to 
agency autonomy and applicable beyond individual 
regulatory procedures, policies governing CoI are of 
high political salience. As a response to major public 
criticism on their existing CoI-regimes, EMA and EFSA 
have repeatedly introduced more restrictive revisions 
over the years. Even ECHA, only created in 2006, re-
formed its initial policy shortly after its creation, mim-
icking recent changes by EMA and EFSA. All three ERAs 
intensified the screening of secretariat staff and com-
mittee members and raised the applied standards (EC-
HA, 2011; EFSA, 2011a; EMA, 2012). Observers 
acknowledge the progress towards protecting the deci-
sion-making of ERAs (European Court of Auditors, 
2012). At the same time, reforms appear to provide a 
strategic response (“symbolic action”, see Boswell, 
2008) to considerable political pressure exerted by the 
European Parliament, the European Court of Auditors 
(2012), the European Ombudsman (2013), and NGOs. 
In addition, reforms show different degrees of success: 
EFSA in particular still experiences major CoI, threaten-
ing its autonomy (Horel & Corporate Europe Observa-
tory, 2013). Interview data suggests that, despite these 
threats, the autonomy of ERAs remains intact. 
Moreover, more restrictive CoI policies trigger unin-
tended side-effects, creating difficulties to recruit high-
level experts:  
Suddenly all agencies get problems of recruiting ex-
perts. You will not find a professor of distinction in 
pharmaceuticals, who has not in some way, via 
third party funding, collaborated with industry. 
Why should he, in the first place? Not everyone, 
who has collaborated with industry is a crimi-
nal….Everyone who exchanges views with industry 
seems to be a Trojan horse for the detriment of 
people or public health…. With the result that we 
have difficulties to recruit experts. (EMA1) 
Colleagues from EFSA agree, saying that “every expert 
naturally has somehow contacts [to industry], other-
wise he would not be an expert” (EFSA6). Another in-
terviewee puts it more cautiously: “Still, there is a de-
gree of a problem, also with the internal experts 
because they have different levels of confidentiality 
and conflicts of interests. It is an issue, always” (EMA3). 
The more recently established ECHA does not experi-
ence these recruitment challenges, yet.  
The analysis shows that CoI-policies ought to delin-
eate a fine line: increasingly successful, they ought to 
protect agency decision-making from external inter-
ests. At the same time, however, they should not pose 
obstacles to the recruitment of high-quality expertise 
crucial for regulatory work: “one has to manage this 
tension: you want qualified people, and these some-
times do come from industry” (ECHA–MB). 
b) Gallium Arsenide 
Although ECHA’s handling of gallium arsenide (GA) 
provides an extreme case, it forms an illustrative ex-
ample of how an ERA can protect its decision-making 
from external pressures by meticulously adhering to 
procedural standards that might otherwise be applied 
more flexibly. Used in the micro-electronics industry, 
GA was classified “category 2” (harmless) by ECHA’s 
Risk Assessment Committee (RAC). Due to novel scien-
tific information provided during the public consulta-
tion procedure, however, the RAC revised its assess-
ment and classified GA as highly carcinogenic 
(“category 1a”). Given the regulatory (and thus eco-
nomic) implications of this opinion, industry raised ma-
jor criticism towards ECHA directly, and towards the 
Commission. Given the acknowledged expert authority 
of ECHA, industry focused its complaints on procedural 
concerns: if they had known about the potentially re-
strictive regulatory action (which was not apparent 
given the initial proposition “category 2”), they would 
have contributed differently to the public consultation.  
Wary of potential litigation, the Commission re-
quested ECHA to re-evaluate the substance. Flooded 
with external comments and aware of the close public 
scrutiny, ECHA became more cautious and invested ex-
tra effort to deliver a legally and scientifically sound 
opinion. Classifying GA as “category 1b”, a committee 
member acknowledges that this “sounds like a rotten 
compromise” (ECHA-RAC). He remains confident, how-
ever, that the committee worked autonomously from 
non-scientific influence. Also, category 1b leads to simi-
larly burdensome authorisation procedures for indus-
try. Since a final decision on GA is still pending (due to 
new scientific information provided by industry), the 
autonomy of this particular decision is difficult to as-
sess. Since the rule-orientation of ECHA and the appar-
ent expertise of committee members kept the scientific 
essence of the opinion intact during the former revi-
sion, the autonomy is assumed to remain high. 
As the authorisation of GA illustrates, however, this 
autonomy might come at a price. Unable to influence 
the decision-making of ECHA, industry successfully de-
lays potentially restrictive regulatory action: with an 
eye to other authorisation processes, an ECHA commit-
tee member observes that although there is “no direct 
influence of lobbying pressures [on science], the strat-
egy is clear: re-opening decision-making or keeping it 
open and therewith eroding the problem” (ECHA-RAC). 
The obligation of ECHA and other ERAs to respond to 
each external comment provided during application 
processes, aimed at assuring the responsiveness of 
ERAs to novel scientific information, potentially con-
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tributes to these delays as it drains on the organisa-
tional resources (EMA6). 
Interview statements suggest that similar observa-
tions can be made on other processes within ECHA (EC-
HA-RAC), but also in other ERAs (e.g., EMA6). The con-
tinuous reforms of CoI policies by all three ERAs in face 
of major external pressures provide a further example 
for ERAs’ awareness of their discretionary space—and 
their willingness to make use of it in order to protect 
their autonomy. The analysis suggests that all three ERAs 
can use their operational discretion in a similar way: 
they can interpret and modify existing regulatory rules 
(at least partly) strategically in order to reduce the chanc-
es of legal litigation, effectively guarding their autonomy.  
The interview material does not allow to assess 
whether all three ERAs make always use of this discre-
tion—most likely they do not. In this vein, the authorisa-
tion of GA remains an extreme case with limited gener-
alizability. Yet, it illustrates the substantive behavioural 
discretion that ERAs enjoy—and could make use of—in 
areas of high political salience. Moreover, interview 
statements suggest that the observed strategic behaviour 
is rather common among the three ERAs under study.  
5. Discussion 
The study enhances our limited understanding on the 
autonomy and operation of ERAs. Despite considerable 
pressures, the decision-making of all three ERAs ap-
pears well protected from both public and private ex-
ternal influence. Whereas other studies have argued 
that EFSA experiences lower degrees of autonomy than 
EMA and—more recently—ECHA (Groenleer, 2014), 
this study observes similarly high degrees of autonomy 
among all three ERAs. A main explanation for this dis-
crepancy can be found in the more narrow definition of 
autonomy applied here. Whereas I argue that EFSA en-
joys substantive autonomy, its opinions might none-
theless be disregarded by regulatory policy makers. 
While EFSA therefore experiences high degrees of au-
tonomy, its policy influence is reported elsewhere to 
be limited (Groenleer, 2014; Ossege, forthcoming). 
Whereas the distinction between policy autonomy and 
influence introduced here increases the analytical lev-
erage of the analysis, the nature of their relationship 
asks for systematic scholarly attention. An agency’s in-
ability to shape regulatory outcomes (low influence) 
might even increase its autonomy: if an ERA’s risk as-
sessment opinion had limited impact on a final policy 
decision, external actors would face strong incentives 
to shop other venues to pursue their interests, leaving 
the agency autonomy intact (Chalmers, 2005). 
Explaining autonomy, the study illustrates that a 
narrow focus on the usual legal and institutional sus-
pects risks overlooking the crucial role of (a) ERAs’ ex-
pertise and (b) their ability to engage in procedural in-
sulation. While these two factors aim to complement—
rather than replace—existing explanations, they pro-
vide substantive explanatory leverage. Within the exist-
ing regulatory framework, the substantive expertise of 
ERAs seems sufficient to explain the high autonomy 
from the Commission. Despite the close procedural 
oversight by the Commission, the substantive infor-
mation asymmetries guard the decision-making of 
ERAs from their political principal. In line with delega-
tion theory (asserting E1a), the Commission thus lacks 
the expert resources to influence the decision-making 
of ERAs (Majone, 2002). Towards private stakeholders, 
the asymmetry loses its explanatory leverage. While 
the expertise of ERAs remains necessary to counter 
stakeholder arguments (E1b), the strong autonomy of 
ERAs more centrally relies on the process of procedural 
insulation (asserting E2): All three ERAs—ECHA due to 
its young age more than the other two—apply the ex-
tensive regulatory framework in a risk-averse manner, 
and moreover adapt the rules over time to suit their 
needs. Paraphrasing Kaufman (2001, p. 34), rules (“red 
tape”) indeed serve as a procedural protection.  
Political salience affects the way in which ERAs en-
gage in procedural insulation (supporting E3): in areas 
of low political salience, procedural insulation tends to 
reflect a process of instrumental problem solving 
(Boswell, 2008; Rissi & Sager, 2013). As an externality, 
raising the procedural hurdle guards the autonomy of 
ERAs. In areas of high political salience, ERAs act more 
strategically (Radaelli, 2009). Adding to insights on the 
utilisation of knowledge, this strategic behaviour also 
applies to the rulemaking of ERAs (Schrefler, 2010). 
Even in highly salient areas, ERAs thus remain autono-
mous from (increasing) external pressures (asserting 
E3b). Findings emphasise that ERAs are not limited to 
an observer’s role; they actively “forge” their autono-
my (Carpenter, 2001). Future research could explore in 
more detail whether this strategic behaviour is also 
used to pursue organisational goals that potentially 
undermine the decision-making of ERAs. Findings allow 
to assess the technocratic claims of ERAs and the legit-
imacy of expert bodies more generally. 
Despite their high degrees of autonomy, all three 
ERAs face conflicts of interest. Although EFSA was cre-
ated with a special eye on guarding its autonomy from 
external influence, it is paradoxically most affected by 
CoI. EFSA’s reliance on university researchers, often 
conducting research funded by industry, provides a po-
tential explanation (Groenleer, 2009). The given find-
ings emphasize the continuous struggle of ERAs to bal-
ance the need for external expert knowledge with 
threat on their autonomy. In any case, the study sug-
gests that CoI—although they exist—do not systemati-
cally affect decision-making. 
The study also locates ERAs in the wider context of 
EU decision-making. The central role of expertise and 
the rule-orientation of ERAs form preconditions for ef-
fective regulation and give credence to their expertise-
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based legitimacy (Majone, 2009). The highly autono-
mous ERAs therewith contribute to a “scientisation” of 
EU decision-making (Flinders, 2004). At the same time, 
the study emphasises the danger of taking autonomy 
as an absolute standard to assess agencies: ECHA’s 
evaluation of gallium arsenide shows that industry can 
effectively delay regulatory action and thus wield ma-
jor influence on regulatory performance in the EU. EF-
SA’s handling of health claims moreover suggests that 
ERAs might run the risk of “hitting the [legal] target but 
missing the [regulatory] point” (Bevan & Hood, 2006, p. 
521). In the end, autonomy proves necessary for high 
quality expert advice. Yet, it is far from sufficient. 
Although the empirical strategy has allowed for a 
systematic comparison of three major ERAs, the study 
faces several shortcomings: while the focus on highly 
“technical” agencies (“extreme cases”) forms a pre-
condition for a sensible analysis of the research ques-
tions at hand, it also limits the generalization of the 
findings. The effects of expertise on autonomy might 
be less pronounced among less “technical” regulatory 
agencies. Accordingly, conclusions concerning the con-
tribution of ERAs towards the “scientisation” of public 
decision-making have to be taken with care. Providing 
valuable insights, this study clearly indicates the neces-
sity of future research on the role of expertise in ERAs 
and other European (and national) expert bodies: being 
the central organisational resource, future research 
should address the role of expertise in non-majoritarian 
institutions more systematically, addressing its effects 
on organisational behaviour more generally, and eval-
uating its importance vis-à-vis other relevant factors. 
Acknowledgements 
Since this article materialised from my PhD research at 
Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sci-
ences (BIGSSS), I am very grateful for the many insight-
ful remarks on this article by my PhD supervisors Beate 
Kohler, Arndt Wonka and Claudio Radaelli. In the same 
breath, I would like to thank my interviewees for shar-
ing their experiences in EU decision-making with me. I 
am particularly grateful to the institutional support 
granted by EMA, EFSA, and ECHA, providing me with 
ample access to their senior staff and scientific experts. 
I am also indebted to the participants of the EPISTO 
conference, Cathrine Holst and Ase Gornitzka, as well 
as the three anonymous reviewers for their critical but 
constructive remarks on this article. 
Conflict of Interests 
The author declares no conflict of interests. 
References 
ANH Europe. (2011). EFSA carries on regardless. Re-
trieved from http://anh-europe.org/news/efsa-
carries-on-regardless 
Bevan, G., & Hood, C. (2006). What’s measured is what 
matters: Targets and gaming in the english public 
health care system. Public Administration, 84(3), 
517-538. 
Boswell, C. (2008). The political functions of expert 
knowledge: Knowledge and legitimation in europe-
an union immigration policy. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 15(4), 471-488.  
Braun, C. (2012). The captive or the broker? Explaining 
public agency? Interest group interactions. Govern-
ance, 25(2), 291-314.  
Brown, M. B. (2009). Science in democracy: Expertise, 
institutions, and representation. Cambridge and 
London: MIT Press.  
Busuioc, M., & Groenleer, M. L. P. (2014). The theory 
and practice of EU agency autonomy and accounta-
bility: Early day expectations, today's realities and 
future perspectives. In M. Everson, C. Monda, & E. 
Vos (Eds.), European agencies in between institu-
tions and member states (pp. 175-200). Alphen aan 
den Rijn: Kluwer Law & Business. 
Busuioc, M. (2013). European agencies: Law and prac-
tices of accountability. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Carpenter, D. P. (2001). The forging of bureaucratic au-
tonomy—Reputation, networks, and policy innova-
tion in executive agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power: Organi-
zational image and pharmaceutical regulation at 
the FDA. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University 
Press. 
Chalmers, D. (2005). Risk, anxiety and the European 
mediation of the politics of life. European Law Re-
view, 30(5), 649-674. 
Chiti, E. (2013). European agencies’ rulemaking: Pow-
ers, procedures and assessment. European Law 
Journal, 19(1), 93-110.  
Curtin, D. (2014). Challenging executive dominance in 
european democracy. The Modern Law Review, 
77(1), 1-32.  
Davis Cross, M. K. (2012). Rethinking epistemic com-
munities twenty years later. Review of International 
Studies, 39(1), 137-160.  
ECHA. (2011). Policy for managing potential conflicts of 
interests (No. POL-00XX.01). Helsinki, Finland: Cor-
porate Publication. 
EFSA. (2011). Policy on independence and scientific de-
cision-making processes of the European food safe-
ty authority. Parma, Italy: EFSA. 
Egeberg, M., & Trondal, J. (2011). EU-level agencies: 
New executive centre formation or vehicles for na-
tional control? Journal of European Public Policy, 
18(6), 868-887.  
EMA. (2012). European medicines agency policy on the 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 101-113 112 
handling of conflicts of interests of scientific com-
mittee members and experts (No. EMA/513078/ 
2010). London, UK: Corporate Publication.  
EMA. (2013). Annual report 2012. London, UK: Corpo-
rate Publication.  
European Court of Auditors. (2012). Management of 
conflict of interest in selected EU agencies (Special 
Report 15). Luxemburg: European Court of Audi-
tors. 
European Ombudsman. (2013). Handling of a potential 
conflict of interest arising from a staff member's 
move to the private sector (Decision No. 0775/ 
2010/ANA). Strasbourg: European Ombudsman. 
Flinders, M. (2004). Distributed public governance in 
the European Union. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 11(3), 520-544.  
Gailmard, S. (2002). Expertise, subversion, and bureau-
cratic discretion. Journal of Law Economics & Or-
ganization, 18(2), 536-555.  
Gehring, T., & Krapohl, S. (2007). Supranational regula-
tory agencies between independence and control: 
The EMEA and the authorization of pharmaceuticals 
in the European single market. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 14(2), 208-226.  
Gormley, W. T. J. (1986). Regulatory issue networks in a 
federal system. Polity, 18(4), 595-620.  
Groenleer, M. L. P. (2009). The autonomy of European 
Union agencies—A comparative study of institu-
tional development. Delft: Eburon. 
Groenleer, M. L. P. (2014). Agency autonomy actually: 
Managerial strategies, legitimacy, and the early de-
velopment of the European Union's agencies for 
drug and food safety regulation. International Pub-
lic Management Journal, 17(2), 255-292. 
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communi-
ties and international policy coordination. Interna-
tional Organization, 46(1), 1-35.  
Horel, S., & Corporate Europe Observatory. (2013). Un-
happy meal. The European food safety authority's 
independence problem. Brussels, Belgium: Corpo-
rate Europe Observatory.  
Jasanoff, S. (1995). Procedural choices in regulatory 
science. Technology in Society, 17(3), 279-293.  
Joerges, C., Ladeur, K., & Vos, E. (1997). Integration sci-
entific expertise into regulatory decision-making: 
National traditions and European innovations. Ba-
den-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Kaufman, H. (2001). Major players: Bureaucracies in 
american government. Public Administration Re-
view, 61(1), 18-42.  
Lavertu, S., & Weimer, D. L. (2009). Integrating delega-
tion into the policy theory literature. Policy Studies 
Journal, 37(1), 93-102.  
Lentsch, J., & Weingart, P. (2011). The politics of scien-
tific advice: Institutional design for quality assur-
ance. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. 
Maggetti, M. (2009). The role of independent regulato-
ry agencies in policy-making: A comparative analy-
sis. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(3), 450-
470. 
Majone, G. (2002). Delegation of regulatory powers in 
a mixed polity. European Law Journal, 8(3), 319-
339.  
Majone, G. (2009). Europe as the would-be world pow-
er. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Moe, T. M. (1995). The politics of structural choice: 
Toward a theory of public bureaucracy. In O. E. Wil-
liamson (Ed.), Organization theory from Chester 
Barnard to the present and beyond (pp. 116-153). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Noordegraaf, M. (2007). From “pure” to “hybrid” pro-
fessionalism: Present-day professionalism in am-
biguous public domains. Administration & Society, 
39(6), 761-785. 
Olsen, J. P. (2007). Understanding Institutions and 
Logics of Appropriateness: Introductory Essay. Cen-
tre for European Studies (ARENA Working Paper 13 
(07)). Oslo, Norway: ARENA.  
Olsen, J. P. (2009). Democratic government, institu-
tional autonomy and the dynamics of change. West 
European Politics, 32(3), 439-465. 
Ossege, C. (forthcoming). European regulatory agen-
cies and EU decision-making. Between expertise and 
influence. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan. 
Pollack, M. A. (2015). Theorizing EU policy-making. In 
H. Wallace, M. A. Pollack, & A. Young (Eds.), Policy-
Making in the European Union (pp. 13-45). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). (2012). Final report on 
the review of the European chemicals agency. Brus-
sels, Belgium: PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Quaglia, L. (2009). How does expertise influence nego-
tiations in the EU? (UCD Dublin European Institute 
Working Paper, 09(09)). Dublin: UCD Dublin. 
Radaelli, C. M. (1995). The role of knowledge in the 
policy process. Journal of European Public Policy, 
2(2), 159-183.  
Radaelli, C. M. (2009). Measuring policy learning: Regu-
latory impact assessment in europe. Journal of Eu-
ropean Public Policy, 16(8), 1145-1164. 
Rissi, C., & Sager, F. (2013). Types of knowledge utiliza-
tion of regulatory impact assessments: Evidence 
from Swiss policymaking. Regulation & Governance, 
7(3), 348-364. 
Rittberger, B., & Wonka, A. (2011). Introduction: Agen-
cy governance in the European Union. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 18(6), 780-789.  
Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (2008). Learning from differ-
ence: The new architecture of experimentalist gov-
ernance in the EU. European Law Journal, 14(3), 
271-327. 
Schrefler, L. (2010). The usage of scientific knowledge 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 101-113 113 
by independent regulatory agencies. Governance, 
23(2), 309-330.  
Shapiro, S., & Guston, D. (2007). Procedural control of 
the bureaucracy, peer review, and episternic drift. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theo-
ry, 17(4), 535-551.  
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in pro-
spect theory: Cumulative representation of uncer-
tainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4), 297-
323. 
Vestlund, N. M. (2014). Exploring EU commission-
agency relationship: Partnership or parenthood? In 
M. Bauer & J. Trondal (Eds.), The palgrave hand-
book of the european administrative system. Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Mcmillan. 
Vibert, F. (2007). The rise of the unelected: Democracy 
and the new separation of powers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Vos, E. (2014). European agencies and the composite 
EU executive. In M. Everson, C. Monda, & E. Vos 
(Eds.), EU agencies in between institutions and 
member states (European Monographs, No. 85 ed., 
pp. 11-47). Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national. 
About the Author 
 
Dr. Christoph Ossege 
Christoph Ossege works as a Senior Policy Officer in the “SSM Policy and Coordination Unit” at the 
German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. He obtained a PhD at Bremen International Gradu-
ate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS), studying the importance of expert knowledge and autonomy 
for the decision-making quality and legitimacy of European Regulatory Agencies (ERAs). Christoph al-
so held positions as honorary university fellow at the Centre for European Governance, Exeter Uni-
versity, and as a visiting researcher at ARENA—Centre for European Studies at Oslo University. 
 
